Abstract: Th e aim of this paper is to establish and clarify the relationship between corruption
INTRODUCTION
Corruption is a signifi cant discussion subject among economists, international and national institutions due to its potential negative eff ects on economic development, either directly or indirectly. It is defi ned as an abuse of public power for private benefi t (Boris Podobnik et al., 2008) , or abusing public power to extract/ accept bribes from the private sector for personal benefi t (Shang-Jin Wei, 1999) . Th ere is a consensus that corruption refers to acts in which the power of public offi ce is used for personal gain against the rule of law (Arvind K. Jain, 2001) . In other words, it is the misuse of public offi ce for private gain (Jakob Svensson, 2005) .
Corruption is a refl ection of a country's legal, economic, cultural and political institutions (Svensson, 2005) . Corruption undermines the state's legitimacy (World Bank, 1998) . It is present in all societies to a greater or lesser extent. It is a persistent feature of human societies over time and space (Toke S. Aidt, 2003) . Most macro-economic variables are determined simultaneously with corruption and there is a causal eff ect between the two (Jain, 2001) .
Th e existence of corruption aff ects economic growth, the level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, investment activity, international trade and price stability negatively and it changes the composition of government expenditures (Axel Dreher and Th omas Herzfeld, 2005) .
Corruption also aff ects the pattern of resource allocation, as well as the distribution of income within society (Jain, 2001 ).
Existence of corruption requires three elements to co-exist (Jain, 2001) . First, someone must have discretionary power. Second, there must be economic rents associated with this power and third, the legal system must off er suffi ciently low probability of detection and penalty for the misconduct. In other words, at least three conditions are necessary for corruption to arise and persist: discretionary power, economic rents and weak institutional frame (Aidt, 2003) . Th ere are two predominant models of corruption: the agency model and the resource allocation model (Jain, 2001) . Agency model is applied to situations where there is information asymmetry, the principal lacks full information about the actions of its agent and in resource allocation models, and corruption changes the relative costs of inputs and outputs as well as the penalties faced by decision-makers. Th e most obvious application of the resource allocation model is for rent-seeking behavior.
Some countries can tolerate relatively high levels of corruption and continue to maintain economic growth, whereas others cannot. According to Asian Development Bank (1997) a state's natural resource base and the sources of its comparative advantage play a critical role in its ability to attract investment. Countries abundant with natural resources often attract more investment that those relying on low wages and labor intensive manufacturing to attract foreign investment. Th erefore, it is interesting to see what the role of corruption in investment intensity and capital abundance is in chosen sample countries. Th e Asian Development Bank (1997) suggests if corruption is highly predictable, the impact on development may be reduced. If corruption is "containable" in this way, its' impact on development is reduced.
Despite all mentioned above, analysis of the cause-eff ect of relationship between corruption and economic growth is still ambiguous. Low level of corruption, of course, is not the only reason explaining economic development. It's not clear to what extent corruption infl uences development through lower investment and therefore lower capital abundance, and how powerful is the infl uence on development through other channels.
Th e aim of this paper is to establish and clarify the relationship between corruption and development among European Union countries. Previous research on this topic (Paulo Mauro 1995, Vito Tanzi and Hamid R. Davoodi, 1997) examined the relation between corruption level and investment.
Following Peter Debeare (2003) who examined the relationship between production factor abundance and GDP per capita based on the Heckscher -Ohlin international trade theory, we wanted to test whether factor abundance gives better performance in explaining the relation with corruption level than just investments.
In order to establish and clarify the relationship between corruption and development among European Union countries, research hypothesis are defi ned as follows: (1) Higher level of corruption among European Union countries causes lower economic development.
(2) Higher level of corruption among European Union countries causes lower capital abundance. Explanatory power of corruption is higher in explaining economic development than in explaining capital abundance.
Paper is divided into six parts. Besides the introduction and conclusion, the paper contains the literature review, methodology explanation, the results of the research and related discussion.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corruption acts as a major deterrent to growth and development (Jain, 2001) . Government offi cials may abuse their arbitrary power to restrict the supply of certain demanded services and in order to surpass that barrier an extra-price of the service is required (Nadia Florino, Emma Galli, and Ilaria Petrarca, 2012: 127) . Bribery can also remove incentives to investments and defi ne a sub-optimal rent-seeking equilibrium of human capital. Both eff ects threaten economic growth.
Studies mainly argue a negative association between corruption level and country's wealth (Podobnik et al., 2008) . It means that poorer countries are more corrupt. Of course, low level of corruption is not the only explanation for poor economic growth. It is widely accepted that large public sectors and pervasive government intervention may be associated with greater corruption (Mauro, 2004) . As countries go through the economic transition to become richer, corruption drops dramatically (Martin Paldam, 2001 ).
Still, the eff ect of corruption on growth remains an empirical question (Florino et al., 2012) . Keith Blackburn, Niloy Bose, and Emranul M. Haque (2011) found that the relationship between corruption and development is two-way causal: bureaucratic malfeasance both infl uences and is infl uenced by economic activity. A consensus seems to have emerged that corruption and other aspects of poor governance and weak institutions have substantial, adverse eff ects on economic growth (Mauro, 2004:1) . It raises the question why countries do not fi ght corruption harder when there is a clear argument that everybody would be better off without it. Mauro (2004) explains that when corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fi ght it. Also, according to his opinion, gradual reforms are less likely to work than more ambitious and comprehensive reforms.
Besides that, Florino et al. (2012) analyzed the interaction between corruption and government expenditure and showed that corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditures have on economic growth. Emanuel Anoruo and Habtu Braha (2005) showed that corruption directly negates economic growth by lowering productivity and indirectly by hampering investment. Blackburn et al. (2011) argue that corruption distorts the quantity and quality of public expenditures. It means that these expenditures are not only infl ated, but also misdirected towards the provision of low-quality public goods. Also, corruption distorts government expenditure towards less productive activities and resources are wasted through rent seeking (Florino et al., 2012) .
Cooper A. Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lustztig (2006) suggest a complex causal relationship between democracy, corruption and economic growth. Th ey argue that the negative eff ect of corruption is mediated by the political process in which corruption occurs, and that democracy will mitigate or reduce the negative eff ect.
Lorenzo Pellegrini (2003) found that institutions are relevant determinants of the income levels of countries and through their eff ect on income, institutions are important factors in shaping environmental policies. If sound institutions foster economic development and the demand for environmental protection increases, institutional quality will produce stricter environmental policies. Institutional quality Pellegrini (2003) approximated with the corruption index published by Transparency International. Gabriela R. Montinola and Robert W. Jackman (2002) analyzed the eff ects of democracy and free markets on corruption. Th ey found that corruption is typically a little higher in countries with intermediate levels of political competition than in dictatorships. But, once past the threshold, higher levels of competition are associated with considerably less corruption. In other words, democratic practices inhibit corruption.
On the sample of estimated bribe payments of Ugandan fi rms, Raymond Fisman and Jakob Svensson (2007) found that rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with fi rm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in fi rm growth of three percentage points. Fisman and Svensson (2007) also found that the eff ect of corruption is much larger than the retarding eff ect of taxation. Paldam (2001) argues that religion can have signifi cant eff ect on the level of corruption. Th e purpose of the analysis he conducted was to show if cultural factors as formed by religious diff erences can explain the corruption index. He showed that two groups of religions decrease corruption: Reform Christianity and Tribal religion. Other religions increase corruption in a similar way.
Eric M. Uslaner (2008) argues that countries cannot escape the corruption easily or at all. According to him, the roots of corruption lie in economic and legal inequality, low level of generalized trust and poor policy choices. He argues the existence of inequality trap, which in fact means that high inequality leads to low trust and high corruption and consequently to more inequality.
Low levels of corruption incidence can be benefi cial to economic growth (Fabio Méndez and Facundo Sepúlveda, 2006) . Also, model of bargaining between politicians and fi rms shows that corruption can facilitate an effi cient allocation of resources and bribes can represent a way to distribute resources between politicians and private sector.
Beata K. Smarzynska, and Javorick S. Wei (2000) empirically showed that corruption reduces inward FDI and shifts ownership structure towards joint ventures. Corruption makes local bureaucracy less transparent and therefore, increases the value of a local joint partner compared to a foreign investor (Smarzynska and Wei, 2000) . However, more technologically-developed foreign investors may be less inclined to form a joint venture because of the possibility of leakage of their technological knowhow. Also, Johann G. Lambsdorff (2004) states that corruption will deter net annual capital infl ows due to its association with a lacking tradition of law and order.
Fahim A. Al-Mahrubi (2000) claims that besides negative consequences of corruption on macroeconomic outcomes such as low investment and slow growth, corruption is partly responsible for high infl ation. Lowering tariff s and other barriers to international trade, unifying market-determined exchange rates and interest rates, eliminating enterprise subsidies, minimizing regulations, licensing requirements and other barriers to entry for new fi rma and investors, demonopolizing regulations and privatizing government assets and transparently enforcing prudential banking regulations and auditing and accounting standards are some of the major policy changes that will unambiguously reduce opportunities for corruption (World Bank, 1998) .
Th ere are some researchers who argue that corruption can in short-run solve some government ineffi ciencies (Florino et al., 2012) . Th e "greasing the wheels hypothesis" implies that corruption has growth-enhancing eff ects in situations where governance is lacking or economic policy is ineffi cient or both. Francis T. Lui (1985) states that fi rms value the time wasted by waiting in queues and are willing to buy with priority by paying a bribe. Th e proponents of this view argue that corruption acts like oil that greases and facilitates the engine of economic growth as it helps government offi cials to make the process of project approval more effi cient (Anoruo and Braha, 2005) .
Corrupt countries can still grow as long as corruption has not gone so far as to undermine economic fundamentals totally (Susan Ackerman-Rose, 1996) . Anticorruption strategies should seek to improve the effi ciency and fairness of government and to enhance the effi ciency of the private sector, not to create a rigid, unresponsive and autocratic government (Ackerman-Rose 1996).
METHODOLOGY
Initially, as a sample we took all European Union member countries (EU28). Due to the fact that we found no available data on gross fi xed capital formation for Greece, Czech Republic and Romania, they were excluded from the analysis. Diagnostics checking of the estimated model showed heteroskedasticity problem as usually being the case in cross-section model estimation. Bulgaria and Luxembourg were removed out of the sample countries due to their outlying properties. In regards to abovementioned, fi nal sample includes 23 countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
Variables' description and data sources are shown in Table 1 . Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was fi rst introduced by Transparency International. Th e Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory's score indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 -100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean (uncorrupt). In general, there was a dilemma in economic research of whether to measure economic growth by growth rate or by GDP per capita (Damir Piplica and Petar Čovo, 2011) . As it is known, growth rate aff ects level of GDP per capita. In a same way the gross fi xed capital formation aff ects the capital abundance. In that manner, we assumed that if we took GDP per capita as variable representing economic development level, it would be appropriate to take capital abundance for representing capital abundance level. Following Edward E. Leamer (1984) and Daniel Trefl er (1995), we calculate countries' capital abundance applying the 15-year double declining balance method as follows: Since relative capital abundance makes the diff erence for each country, we consider labour abundance and calculate capital abundance as follows:
We assume the relationship between GDP per capita, capital abundance and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and therefore we employ linear regression models.
Firstly we tested stationarity assumption validity for each of the observed variables as prerequirements for parameters estimation in regression models. In order to test stationarity characteristics we employed the Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test.
Afterwards, we employed the ordinary least squares (OLS) method as a parameter estimator in defi ned models.
Estimated linear regression models are defi ned in regression equations (1), (2), (3) and (4).
In order to determine how well the diff erence in capital abundance and Corruption Perceptions Index, together, can explain the diff erence in GDP per capita we defi ned a linear regression model which has GDP per capita as dependent variable and capital abundance (RCA) and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as independent variables.
(1) Furthermore, we wanted to check for how well the diff erence in CPI can explain the diff erence in RCA. If corruption discourages investment then country with higher CPI should have lower capital abundance. In order to determine explanatory power of CPI in explaining capital abundance we defi ned auxiliary regression model as follows.
Afterwards, we wanted to check for how well the diff erence in CPI only can explain the diff erence in GDP per capita. In order to determine explanatory power of CPI only in explaining GDP per capita among sample countries we defi ned auxiliary regression model as follows.
Also, we wanted to test to what extent only the variable RCA can explain GDP per capita. In order to test how well the diff erence in RCA can explain the diff erence in GDP per capita we defi ned linear regression model as follows.
After parameters estimation, testing the assumptions of linear regression has been performed for each of the estimated models as follows:
• In order to test homoscedasticity (constant variance) of the errors versus the predictions we employed White test.
• In order to test normality of the errors we employed Jarque-Bera test. JarqueBera test is a goodness-of-fi t test of whether sample data have the skewness and kurtosis matching a normal distribution.
• In order to test autocorrelations among errors we employed correlogram. Coeffi cient of determination, denoted R squared, indicates how well data fi t the statistical model. In other words, how much of variability observed in a dependent variable can be explained by variability of independent variables. Comparing the Coeffi cient of determination in model (2) and model (3) it can be seen how much CPI level infl uences GDP per capita and how CPI level infl uences capital abundance (RCA). Comparing the Coeffi cient of determination in model (3) and model (4) it can be seen how much CPI level infl uences GDP per capita and how much capital abundance (RCA) infl uences GDP per capita.
Based on the abovementioned comparison it can be seen how much CPI level infl uences GDP per capita through capital abundance and how much through other channels, as well as role of corruption level and production factor abundance in economic development.
RESULTS

By performing the Phillips-Perron Unit Root
Test we found all of the observed variables stationary around constant (Table 2) . Table 3 shows that if RCA increases for 1 EUR, CPI being constant, GDP per capita will increase for 0.63 % in regards to GDP per capita of EU28. If CPI increases for 1, RCA being constant, GDP per capita will increase for 5.33 % in regards to GDP per capita of EU28. Diff erence in factor abundance and CPI together can explain 94.11% of diff erences in GDP per capita among sample countries (Table 3) .
In accordance to the abovementioned we can accept the hypothesis that states higher level of corruption among European Union countries causes lower economic development.
If corruption discourages investment then countries with lower CPI should have lower capital abundance. In order to determine explanatory power of CPI in explaining capital abundance we defi ned auxiliary regression model (2) and estimated results are shown in the Table 4 . Out of the estimated results it can be seen that if CPI increases for 1, meaning lower corruption level, RCA will increase for 12.88 EUR. In accordance to abovementioned, we can accept the hypothesis that states that higher level of corruption among European Union countries causes lower capital abundance.
In accordance with the White test results we found no heteroskedasticity in any of the estimated models. Jarque-Bera test confi rms normal distribution of residuals in all models and correlogram shows no autocorrelation in any estimated model. Th erefore, all of the required model assumptions are satisfi ed.
According to the estimated regression model (2), diff erence in CPI can explain 76.55% of diff erences in capital abundance among sample countries (table 4) . Out of the estimated regression model (3) we found that diff erence in CPI can explain 84.57% of diff erences in GDP per capita among sample countries ( Table 5 ). Th erefore, we can accept the hypothesis that states explanatory power of corruption is higher in explaining economic development than in explaining capital abundance. 
DISCUSSION
Th e results have shown that capital abundance is the main determinant of GDP per capita among sample countries. It is possible to attract some (however, limited) investment in a country despite the high level of corruption due to natural resources abundance or low wage and labor intensive manufacturing.
High corruption level is strongly correlated with low capital abundance among sample countries. Furthermore, the eff ect of high corruption level infl uences GDP per capita through other channels, besides capital abundance. Corruption can slow down accumulation of human capital (Pak H. Mo, 2001) . As a consequence, negative eff ects on GDP per capita can come through that channel.
Other possible explanation could be that available capital is not used effi ciently in a country with high corruption level. Even though the used sample of European Union countries is a heterogeneous sample in regards to GDP per capita, factor abundance and corruption level as chosen variables have high statistical signifi cance and explanation power. Contrary to the GDP growth and investment, it takes some time to achieve certain level GDP per capita, as well as factor abundance. Th erefore, chosen variables show long-run eff ects of development and capital accumulation. Mo (2001) found that 1% increase in the corruption level reduces the growth rate by about 0.72%. Also, he argues that the most important channel through which corruption aff ects economic growth is political instability, which accounts for about 53 % of the total eff ect. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) estimated correlation between Corruption index and public investment on the world sample and found correlation of 20.07 %. Mauro (1995) estimated cross-section model on a sample of 50 countries using the World Bank data from 1960 to 1985 and found correlation up to 44 %. Th e model estimated in this paper taking the sample of 23 EU countries, involving factor abundance instead of investment, shows even higher correlation (76.55%). It may be the case that taking in account capital abundance instead of investment model achieves higher explanatory power.
Our fi nding that corruption has negative infl uence on economic growth is consistent with numerous researches. Podobnik et al. (2008) analyzed the dependence of the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita growth rates on changes in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for the period 1999 -2004. On the sample of all countries in the world they found that, on average, an increase of CPI by one unit leads to an increase of the annual GDP per capita growth rate by 1.7%. By performing regression analysis only on the European Union countries with transition economies, they found that an increase of CPI by one unit leads to an increase of the annual GDP per capita growth rate by 2.4%. Podobnik et al. (2008) also found a statistically signifi cant power-law functional dependence between foreign direct investment (FDI) received by diff erent countries per capita and the country corruption level measured by the CPI. Th ey also found that the presence of corruption undermines the positive impact that public expenditure has on economic growth, if productive.
Claire Wallace and Christian W. Haerpfer (2000) found a high correlation between economic growth on the one hand, and level of corruption on the other. Lambsdorff (2004) showed that an increase in corruption by one point on a scale from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt) lowers productivity by 4% of GDP and decreases net annual capital infl ows by 0.5% of GDP.
Results of the research conducted by Anoruo and Braha (2005) who investigated the eff ect of corruption on economic growth for 18 African countries indicate that a one-unit increase in corruption retards economic growth by roughly 0.87 % percent. Also, one-unit increase in corruption translates to about 4.69% decrease in investment share of GDP. Dreher and Herzfeld (2005) calculated that an increase of corruption by about one index point reduces GDP growth by 0.13 percentage points and GDP per capita by 425 USD.
CONCLUSION
Th e research conducted in this paper showed high explanatory power of corruption level in explaining the diff erences in economic development represented by GDP per capita among 23 European Union member countries. Th erefore, the level of corruption can explain the diff erence in economic development among European Union countries. At the same time, we found high coeffi cient of determination in estimated models, corruption level being independent variable, and capital abundance a dependent one. Furthermore, we found capital abundance to be better explaining variable than investments in models taking in account corruption level and explaining economic development. Out of the estimated models one can conclude that higher level of corruption among European Union countries is related with capital abundance. Eventually, explanatory power of corruption is higher in explaining economic development than in explaining capital abundance. If the corruption level infl uences economic development and capital abundance then the adverse infl uence will be not only through lower capital abundance but through capital effi cient usage as well. Further research could be directed towards analyzing correlation between other factors abundance (like skilled labor), effi cient capital usage and corruption level as well as endogeneity of the corruption level in the estimated models.
Based on the fi ndings of this paper, the eff orts should be made to curtail corruption especially in the new EU members, which are post-communist economies. Th ere is no doubt that reducing corruption would be benefi cial for all countries. Since corruption is a wrongdoing, the rule of law enforcement is of utmost importance. However, root-causes of corruption, namely the institutional and soci-
